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Aging in the Shadow
of the Three Pillars
A Generation of Pension Debates
in Switzerland (1972–2010)
Matthieu Leimgruber
Paul Bairoch Institute of Economic History,
University of Geneva
THE BEST PENSION SYSTEM IN THE WORLD?
Since its consecration by the World Bank in its well-known report, 
Averting the Old Age Crisis (1994), as well as its adoption a decade 
later in an EU directive on pension funds, the three-pillar doctrine has 
been one of the potent metaphors of contemporary pension reform 
(Coron 2007; Tausch 2002). The principles underlying this model are 
well known: state pay-as-you-go pensions (fi rst pillar) should remain a 
basic component, to which occupational (second pillar) and individual 
(third pillar) prefunded pensions should be added. This structure may 
seem at fi rst a neutral and factual depiction of the inherent nature of 
modern pension systems. Yet, the pillar doctrine has a strong norma-
tive dimension: it aims both to contain the scope of pay-as-you-go state 
(social security) pensions and to favor funded solutions whose manage-
ment is devolved to private fi nancial institutions.
Switzerland occupies a special position in this reform discourse. 
Indeed, the country is a pioneer of the three-pillar doctrine, whose prin-
ciples have been anchored in the Federal Constitution since 1972. In 
early 2010, a leading pension consultancy fi rm even awarded Switzer-
land, and in particular its mandatory second occupational pillar, a gold 
medal, designating it as the “best pension system in the world” (Mercer 
2010).1 This ranking underscored the enthusiasm for the Swiss pension 
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system among the fi nancial actors who are involved in its management. 
Consider this somewhat arrogant statement from a Swiss Re economist: 
“The Swiss pension system comes off rather well in comparison to the 
rotten social insurance systems of its European neighbors [and] rightly 
deserves the high esteem it receives from abroad: its foundations are 
properly laid” (Trauth 2000). More could be said of the international 
diffusion of the multi-pillar doctrine, notably on the role played by 
Swiss insurers in this process before the 1994 adoption of the doctrine 
by the World Bank (Leimgruber 2009). Moreover, as is often the case 
when foreign national examples are summoned and designated as mod-
els, accolades and rankings often remain silent on the controversies and 
struggles that structure these national systems.
On March 7, 2010, a large majority (72.7 percent) of Swiss vot-
ers turned down a proposed reduction in the conversion rate that 
determines the calculation of second pillar benefi ts, which would have 
effectively reduced those benefi ts.2 This reduction, which had been pre-
sented as a necessity to ensure the long-term fi nancing of occupational 
pensions facing demographic aging and uncertain fi nancial returns, was 
supported by the Federal Council (the executive branch), right-wing 
parties—who enjoyed a comfortable majority in the Federal Parlia-
ment at that time—as well as business associations, the pension lobby, 
and the insurance industry. The main Swiss trade union (UNIA), the 
Socialist Party, and consumers’ associations strongly opposed the pro-
posed cut in pension benefi ts. As soon as the conversion rate had been 
accepted by Parliament in late 2008, these forces launched a popular 
referendum that gathered 125,000 signatures in 30 days, whereas only 
50,000 in 90 days were necessary.3 A stormy political debate preceded 
the March 2010 vote. The main Swiss business association, Econo-
miesuisse, allegedly spent 10 million Swiss francs (CHF) in favor of a 
“yes” vote (Wuthrich 2010).4 However, the well-oiled campaign of po-
litical power, mainstream media, and business associations fl oundered: 
the denunciation of “pension theft” and of the meddling of fi nancial 
interests into pensions carried the day.
The long-term impact of the referendum vote is still uncertain, but 
its importance cannot be underestimated. First, the referendum under-
scores the increasing polarization of occupational pension debates, 
after decades during which these had remained confi ned to experts. 
The March vote also has a historic dimension. It is the fi rst time since 
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1972, when the three-pillar doctrine was added to the Constitution, that 
Swiss voters have expressed their views on the second pillar. After a 
generation of maturation, occupational pensions now occupy a central 
position in Swiss old age provision. This chapter analyzes these three 
aspects so as to place the March 2010 vote in a larger historical context 
and to highlight the antagonisms that currently agitate the discussions 
of the Swiss second pillar.
THE TRAJECTORY OF THE THREE-PILLAR
DOCTRINE IN SWITZERLAND
This chapter cannot retrace the century-long trajectory of Swiss oc-
cupational pensions (see Box 9.1 for a short summary). I will instead 
underline fi ve key features that have shaped the pension system (see 
Table 9.1 for more information on the different pillars).
First, the histories of the different pillars of the Swiss pension sys-
tem have always been deeply interconnected. The existence of a strong 
private pension lobby has contributed both to the belated introduction 
of the Old-Age and Survivors’ Insurance (AHV, the fi rst pillar, intro-
duced in 1947) and to the moderate expansion of this pay-as-you-go 
basic social security pension during the postwar growth decades. This 
moderation favored the gradual and selective development of pension 
plans and enabled them to remain largely autonomous vis-à-vis the fed-
eral state. The 1972 vote on the three-pillar doctrine not only aimed to 
improve pensioners’ incomes by granting a supplementary benefi t to 
almost all wage earners. It fi rst and foremost aimed to contain (in the 
anticommunist meaning of the period) the development of the pay-as-
you-go AHV and to preserve funded pensions from being marginalized 
by the “people’s pensions” project. The three-pillar doctrine suc-
ceeded in blocking this alternative path and steered the pension system 
in another direction. From 1972 onward, all future improvements of 
pensions have been dependent on the expansion of funded occupational 
pensions (the second pillar). I will return below to the long-term con-
sequences of this crucial crossroads, but we can immediately grasp its 
importance by examining Figure 9.1. Since the 1970s, old-age pensions 
have represented about half of overall social expenditures. However, 
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Box 9.1  Origins of the Three-Pillar Doctrine in Switzerland5
1918–1948: A divided pension system
With the exception of a handful of pioneering fi rms and public ad-
ministrations, the “big bang” of occupational provision can be dated 
from 1916. A federal tax on war profi ts enacted that year introduced 
special deductions for fi rms that created a pension or welfare fund for 
their workers. By the end of World War I, life insurance companies sold 
their fi rst group pension contracts and participated in the development 
of the pension market. By 1930, 18 percent of the nonfarm workforce 
was covered by funded plans with reserves that represented 26 percent 
of GDP in 1937. The development of occupational pensions was facili-
tated by the failure to enact state pensions at the federal level (old-age 
and survivors’ benefi ts, or AHV) in 1931. After slowing down during the 
economic depression of the 1930s, the expansion of pension plans ac-
celerated during World War II. The federal government also launched a 
new AHV project during the war, which was fi nally overwhelmingly ac-
cepted by the voters in 1947. The fi rst AHV pension checks were modest 
(amounting to 10–15 percent of wages), so as neither to compete with 
existing pension plans nor hinder the creation of new ones.
1948–1972: The three-pillar doctrine versus the people’s pensions
During the postwar growth decades, an informal division of tasks 
was established between the AHV (the future fi rst pillar) and occupa-
tional plans (the future second pillar). While the AHV provided a basic 
pay-as-you-go benefi t, occupational plans increased their coverage 
from 20 percent (1955) to 30 percent (1970) of all wage earners, of-
fered very differentiated benefi ts, and played a key role in personnel 
management. The fi nancial reserves of the occupational plans were 
already considerable and reached 40 percent of Swiss GDP by 1970. 
The three-pillar doctrine was elaborated during the 1960s. This concept 
was favored by the political right, business, and insurers and aimed to 
anchor occupational plans in the old-age retirement system and thus 
contain the expansion of the pay-as-you-go AHV. It was also supported 
by trade unions seduced by the idea that they might obtain a larger say 
in fi rm management through the boards of pension plans. The “people’s 
pensions” was an alternative proposal favored by the left wing of the 
Socialist Party and other far-left groups. Its aim was to expand the pay-
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as-you-go component (AHV) of the pension system to the detriment of 
its funded plans. The three-pillar doctrine, at the core of which is the idea 
of mandatory second pillar occupational pensions, was fi nally accepted 
by a large majority of voters in 1972. The leadership of the Socialist 
Party, as well as trade union secretaries, contributed to this victory by 
convincing their rank and fi le of the necessity to implement a state man-
date so as to guarantee pensions that would be both generous and partly 
co-managed by workers’ representatives.
Unresolved issues on the scope and content of occupational plans 
were later addressed in the Federal Law on Occupational Pensions 
(BVG, 1982–1985), but this law did not address the demands made a 
decade earlier by the left and largely preserved the autonomy of occupa-
tional pension plans.
the relative importance of each pillar has changed. While AHV expen-
diture (as a percentage of GDP) has remained stable since 1980, second 
pillar expenditures have more than doubled during the same period, and 
prefunded pension expenditures now exceed those of the AHV. These 
numbers do not tell us anything about the respective importance of each 
pillar in pensioners’ income, but they clearly illustrate the maturation 
of occupational provision. Today, as during the twentieth century, the 
pension pillars do not evolve in isolation. Unfortunately, the policy 
cycles followed by the AHV and the second pillar are seldom syn-
chronized, which may blur a proper understanding of their enduring 
interconnections.
Second, despite state regulations, occupational provision remains a 
domain in which private interests retain a great deal of infl uence. De-
spite its institutional fragmentation (over 2,000 pension plans were in 
operation in 2010) and the existence of large pension plans in the public 
sector, occupational provision is dominated by a powerful lobby, com-
posed of large autonomous corporate plans, a handful of life insurance 
companies, and various pension experts and consultancies. Insurers in 
particular have nurtured an important pensions market since the 1920s 
and have played a key role in shaping business perspectives on old-age 
provision.6 By 2010, group insurance pension contracts covered about 
40 percent of wage earners affi liated with mandatory second pillar pen-
sions (BVG). Insurance companies also managed one-fi fth of second 
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Old-age and survivors’ 







Confederation 2,430 pension plans: autonomous 
corporate plans, group contracts, 
and “collective foundations” 
(multi-employer plans)
Life insurance companies and 
banks
Coverage Universal coverage About 90 percent of the workforce
Wage entry fl oor = CHF19,890 
of annual income or 75%  of a 
maximum AHV pension
Voluntary affi liation: 
approximately half of the 
working population subscribes 
to a “linked” 3rd pillar account 
(“3a account,” see below)
Financing mode Pay as you go: payroll tax 
(8.4% levied on all wages 
without ceiling, provides 
75% of fi nancing needs), 
state subsidies (20%), and 
AHV reserve fund (5%) 
Funded: payroll tax (8–10% of 
wages); the wage ceiling above 
which the BVG payroll tax is not 
levied is equal to three times the 
maximum AHV pension.
Funded individual savings: 
voluntary contributions are 
capped. Wage earners with 
BVG coverage may contribute 
CHF6,566 per year, while 
self-employed without BVG 
coverage may contribute 
CHF32,832 per year.
Table 9.1  The Swiss Three-Pillar Pension System (2010)
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Benefi ts Ranging between 
CHF1,140–2,280 per month, 
mixed indexation (wages 
and prices)
State authorities provide 
supplementary means-tested 
old-age assistance (AHV 
Ergänzungsleistungen; AVS)
Benefi ts and indexation procedures 
vary among pension plans.
Benefi ts can also take the form of 
lump sums.
Annuities or lump sums
Reserves and assets Approximately one year of 
expenditure (about CHF3 
billion)
About CHF600 billion About CHF60 billion
Replacement income Combined AHV and BVG benefi ts should offer replacement rates 
of at least 60 percent of wages.
Negligible role in old-age 
provision, but key tax deduction 
for higher income population. 
Tax expenditure for 3rd pillar 
accounts cost CHF450 million to 
the Confederation each year.
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pillar pension reserves (about CHF125 billion). Occupational provision 
is the source for half of life insurance premiums levied in Switzerland.7 
Life insurers’ prominence has been, and is still, a source of tension 
among business interests. Small- and medium-size entrepreneurs often 
resent the conditions imposed on them by insurance actuaries. How-
ever, the main business associations and actors of the pension industry 
agree on defending the basic principles of the three-pillar doctrine.
Third, the integration of trade unions into management of occupa-
tional pensions has led to ambivalent outcomes. Pension comanagement 
and workers’ participation on pension boards was a longstanding union 
demand and has constituted a major activity for union representatives. 
These boards have increased trade union acquiescence toward business 
personnel management goals while making impossible any genuine 
“workers’ control” of pension funds. Union participation in the three-
pillar doctrine has thus reinforced funded old-age provision to the 
detriment of more redistributive pay-as-you-go provision.
Fourth, old-age benefi ts are only one facet of the second pillar. 
Since their inception, occupational plans have been used by employ-
ers to favor “labor peace” and facilitate personnel management. Tax 























6.3 6.5 6.5 6.2 7.1 7.2 6.9
0
5
Aging in the Shadow of the Three Pillars   233
deductions for pension plans have always been an important incentive 
for business. Fifth, the funded reserves of the second and third pillar 
are considerable. The pillar structure thus offers a profi table business 
activity for the insurance companies and banks that participate in the 
management and investment of pension reserves. For the reasons men-
tioned above, life insurers are particularly well entrenched at the core of 
occupational pension provision. Unsurprisingly, this situation has been 
criticized by the left and trade unions, which underscores the contradic-
tions between the growing role of occupational provision in retirees’ 
incomes and insurers’ profi t goals.
Finally, it is important to consider the Swiss pension system in an 
international comparison. Switzerland belongs to the leading OECD 
countries in terms of private social expenditure for health and pensions 
(Table 9.2). The Swiss pension system bears little resemblance to its 
French and German neighbors, but is much more similar to those in 
the Netherlands as well as the United Kingdom and the United States. 
The decentralization of Swiss occupational provision and insurers’ in-
volvement in pensions is similar to the systems in the United Kingdom 
and the United States, but the post-1972 expansion of the mandatory 
second pillar has brought Switzerland closer to the Dutch system, with 
one important difference. Large multi-employer plans linked to collec-
tive bargaining are central to Dutch occupational provision, while such 
institutions play a marginal role in Switzerland.
The elements enumerated above underscore the critical role of the 
mandatory second pillar in the Swiss pension system. After the 1972 
vote, the history of occupational provision can be divided into three 
periods. From 1972 to 1982, the outcomes of the political negotiations 
on BVG legislation favored the expansion of pension plans while main-
taining a mild regulatory framework. In a second phase, from 1982 to 
2000, occupational pension provision continued to expand among the 
workforce while the issue of its regulation remained off the political 
agenda. These fi rst two periods are briefl y analyzed in the next section, 
and as we will see in the fourth section of this chapter, the current radi-
calization of second pillar controversies from 2000 onward is a direct 
consequence of this long-term maturation process.
Two opposing dynamics structure the post-1972 period. The fi rst 
dynamic, fueled by demands from the political left and trade unions, 
has aimed to reinforce the collective and redistributive elements of the 
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Mandatory and voluntary private social 
expenditure (%  GDP, 2005)
Private social 
expenditure as a share of 




Old age, health and  
disability Only old age
United States 10.1 3.8 38.9 140.6
Switzerland 8.4 5.3 29.3 151.9
Netherlands 8.3 4.1 28.5 149.1
United Kingdom 7.1 4.7 25.1 96.4
OECD average (30 
countries)
2.9 1.5 11.8 111.0a 
France 3.0 0.2 9.3 17.9
Germany 3.0 0.8 10.1   6.9
Table 9.2  Private Social Expenditure: An International Comparison
SOURCE: Federal Offi ce of Statistics (OFS), Federal Social Insurance Administration (OFAS), and Financial Market Authority (FINMA).
a Pension fund assets as a percentage of overall OECD GDP.
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second pillar, to bolster solidarity between their members, and to sub-
mit pension plans to stricter state regulation. Contrary to these aims, 
business forces and the pension lobby have fought to safeguard the au-
tonomy of pension plans, develop the pension market, and limit the 
solidaristic dimensions of the second pillar. These two antagonistic 
dynamics are riddled with internal contradictions. How indeed is it pos-
sible to increase “social solidarity” in a second pillar whose original 
aim was to limit solidarity and redistribution? At the same time, recent 
pension controversies underscore how it is diffi cult for proponents of 
pension funding to disentangle themselves from the growing social ob-
ligations linked to the maturation of the second pillar.
THE THREE-PILLAR DOCTRINE IN PRACTICE (1972–2000)
The decade that followed the 1972 vote witnessed the abandonment 
of the pursuit of a second pillar system that had universal cover-
age, offered benefi ts modeled on the best pension plans of the time 
(mostly public service defi ned benefi ts plans), and had extensive co-
management procedures and robust state regulation. These objectives, 
all of which had fi gured among the arguments presented in 1972 by the 
Socialist Party leadership as a substitute for the people’s pensions, faced 
considerable obstacles. Indeed, the political right, businesses, and the 
pension industry worked to safeguard the autonomy of existing plans 
and to allow plans to choose freely between defi ned benefi t or defi ned 
contribution structures (which were then in the majority among private 
sector plans). These groups also downplayed the constraints of the state 
mandate by introducing into the Federal BVG law a wage fl oor under 
which low-wage workers would not be covered by the second pillar as 
well as a wage ceiling above which fi rms could freely organize supple-
mental benefi ts for handpicked categories of employees.
The turn toward austerity that followed the economic crisis of the 
1970s, continued business determination to limit the scope of the state 
mandate, and the abandonment of the people’s pensions alternative all 
were factors in the legislative debate that led to the adoption of the 
1982 BVG law on the mandatory second pillar. The complexity of oc-
cupational provision also contributed to keeping these debates buried 
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in experts’ commissions and away from public scrutiny (Hafner 2004; 
Lusenti 1989; Rechsteiner 1984). In 1978, a fi rst BVG draft failed to 
obtain a parliamentary majority. Even if they had pushed for the BVG, 
insurers were not dissatisfi ed by this outcome, which was the result of 
increased business resistance toward too much state regulation of pen-
sion plans. Considering this failure as “non-tragic,” the directors’ board 
of Winterthur Life, a leading group pension provider, underscored in 
December of that year that “efforts to simplify the law [were] in the 
interest of [our] company.”8
The outcomes of the state mandate implemented in 1982 have 
remained ambiguous. The immense majority of wage earners were 
now covered by pension plans, but lower wage workers and tempo-
rary workers, primarily women, struggled to overcome the wage fl oor 
limiting participation in the mandatory pensions system. The consti-
tutional aim stating that AHV (social security) and BVG occupational 
pension benefi ts should reach a combined replacement rate of 60 per-
cent of former wages remained insuffi cient for those with low incomes. 
The level of BVG benefi ts, as well as their indexation, continued to 
vary considerably. Finally, the institutional decentralization of occupa-
tional provision, its opacity, the gradual phasing in of portability rights, 
and the absence of labor-management boards among the myriad of 
group pension contracts covering small- and medium-sized fi rms only 
reinforced the complexity of the pension system. In parallel to the im-
plementation of the BVG pension law, AHV social security benefi ts 
were de facto frozen. Their replacement rate (about one-third of wages) 
has not improved since the eighth AHV revision enacted in 1973–1975. 
The introduction of benefi ts indexation in 1978 has only maintained 
this level. The mandatory second pillar has acted as a Trojan horse by 
anchoring in the middle of the pension system institutional and funding 
mechanisms that counteract the redistributive and solidaristic dimen-
sions of social insurance.
While the BVG pension law has had an ambivalent impact on the 
quality and level of benefi ts, notably for low-wage workers and women, 
it has spurred the pension market and notably life insurers’ activities. 
Between 1983 and 1985, or the time that elapsed between the fi nal par-
liamentary vote on the BVG and its implementation, the annual profi ts 
of Rentenanstalt/Swiss Life tripled (Hafner 2004; Hepp 1993). The ex-
pansion of the second pillar mostly concerned small- and medium-sized 
Aging in the Shadow of the Three Pillars   237
fi rms that instituted group pension contracts to comply with the manda-
tory requirement. Banks and insurance companies also benefi ted from 
the fi nancial fl ows generated by the opening of individual third pillar 
savings accounts. The third pillar today plays an important, though 
mostly symbolic, role. The concept of personal responsibility and in-
dividual savings is included in the pension system, which offers tax 
deductions to people with higher incomes, while playing a negligible 
role in most pensioners’ overall incomes.
In the end, the “constraints of obligation” introduced by the BVG 
pension law have remained mild and the law, according to econo-
mist Graziano Lusenti (1989), respected the “traditional framework” 
of occupational provision and limited itself to “minimal dispositions” 
and “half measures.” The number of persons receiving BVG manda-
tory pension benefi ts to supplement their AHV social security pension 
remained rather low until the 1990s. At the same time, the buoyant fi -
nancial markets of the 1980s and 1990s offered a favorable context for 
the maturation of the second pillar. Pension plans could easily comply 
with one of the framework regulations introduced in 1985, namely the 
obligation to guarantee a minimum 4 percent rate of return on invested 
BVG pension assets. During this period, pension funds consolidated 
their positions as key institutional investors (Theurillat, Crevoisier, 
and Corpataux 2006). The experience gathered by Swiss insurance 
companies in the domain of occupational provision also enabled them 
to participate in foreign markets (e.g., in Eastern Europe and Latin 
America), where a transnational social security reform campaign or-
chestrated by fi nancial international organizations was taking place 
(Lordon 2000; Orenstein 2008). Renewed demands from the parlia-
mentary left for an amelioration of the BVG pension law long remained 
without concrete impact, and until the late 1990s, the second pillar 
continued its development without enduring much political scrutiny. 
This below-the-radar evolution highlights the asynchronous nature of 
pension debates, which mainly focused on the AHV pension during the 
1990s. A brief overview of these controversies is useful as it reveals 
dynamics that are currently at play in the second pillar.
Even though AHV pension benefi ts were frozen, attempts to im-
prove them continued and focused in particular on pension inequalities 
between men and women. In a context characterized by recurrent 
economic crises and continuing austerity pressures, these efforts culmi-
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nated in a tenth revision of the AHV, implemented in 1995. This revision 
introduced several improvements for women, including replacing “cou-
ple benefi ts” with individual ones and introducing pension bonuses that 
accounted for years spent raising children. It also inaugurated the fi rst 
increase in the retirement age for women (from 62 to 64 years) as well 
as cuts in widowers’ benefi ts. A proposed eleventh AHV revision envi-
sioned annual cuts in benefi ts amounting to about CHF1 billion. The 
revision was condemned by the left and trade unions as antisocial and 
challenged through a strong referendum campaign, and fl oundered in 
early 2004. A new draft of the revision faced much controversy before 
being buried again in autumn 2010. This transition from compromise 
to clear-cut confl ict underscores the hardening of pension debates in 
Switzerland and notably the resistance to austerity cuts presented as 
necessary consolidation measures.
AHV social security benefi t reform packages combining im-
provements and cuts have attracted the attention of political scientists 
(Bertozzi, Bonoli, and Gay-des-Combes 2005; Bertozzi and Gilardi 
2008; Bonoli 2004). Yet they have only recently integrated the second 
pillar in their analyses. This renewed interest is linked to the current 
maturation of occupational provision and attempts to reform the system 
in a period of demographic and fi nancial uncertainty.
While the number of pension plans has fallen steeply since the late 
1970s as a result of consolidation, the basic institutional structures of 
the second pillar have not fundamentally changed (Table 9.3). Despite 
the losses incurred during the dot com crash and the fi nancial crisis that 
started in 2008, second pillar pension assets still exceed Swiss GDP. 
Occupational provision is still dominated by a few dozen large pension 
plans managed by leading fi rms and public administrations, as well as 
a few insurance companies. Leading pension providers, such as Swiss 
Life or AXA-Winterthur, cover about half of the 1.6 million persons 
covered by group contracts (FINMA 2009). By contrast, mandatory 
participation in the second pillar has led to a threefold increase in the 
number of pension benefi ciaries and a resulting increase in benefi t pay-
ments. This maturation constitutes an obvious source for the growing 
controversies that have characterized occupational pension provision 
in the recent period. Second pillar pension institutions have not been 
spared the challenges of rising life expectancy, especially in a period 
riddled with recurring fi nancial crises and sluggish economic growth.
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Moreover, popular expectations of second pillar pensions have 
remained high. This is the case not only because mandatory BVG 
pensions play a growing role in pensioners’ benefi ts, but it is also the 
result of two decades of alarmism about the sustainability of AHV pen-
sions, which has shifted popular views of the alleged safe haven of 
occupational benefi ts. The hopes that people have in terms of pension 
provision from the second pillar may well contradict the priorities of 
the pension providers. This evolution sets business and life insurers in 
a tricky situation. They have successfully contained the AHV social 
security program and redirected pension development toward funded 
solutions, but after having cashed in on the expansion of occupational 
provision caused by the BVG pension law, the pension plans now have 
to face increasing obligations.
Finally, the political left and trade unions have pursued their efforts 
to improve BVG pension benefi ts, which they consider as insuffi cient 
for many low-wage workers. These forces disapprove of fi nancial con-
solidation measures to reduce pensioners’ incomes, underscore the 
hefty management costs of pension plans, and disapprove of their lack 
of transparency. The long-term maturation of the second pillar as well 
as the contradictory demands faced by the system have spurred a shift 
from a fragile political quid pro quo to open confrontation. The recent 
controversy on the BVG benefi ts conversion rate thus constitutes the 
1978 2008
BVG pension plans >10,000 around 2,400
Insured persons—millions (as a % of the workforce)











BVG benefi ts—CHF billions





BVG assets—CHF billions (as a % of GDP)






Table 9.3  The Maturation of the Second Pillar (1978–2008)
SOURCE : La prévoyance professionnelle en Suisse. Statistique des caisses de pension, 
various years, Swiss Federal Statistical Offi ce.
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second act of an ongoing controversy that began a decade ago during 
the fi rst BVG revision.
FROM COMPROMISE TO DIRECT CONFRONTATION 
(2000–2010)
Although the political rhythms of the fi rst two pension pillars re-
main disjointed, debates focused on one of them have often, even if 
belatedly, been echoed in the other. Thus, in the wake of the tenth AHV 
revision, proposals to improve the second pillar have also focused on 
the situation of women. From the end of the 1990s onward, the left 
has repeatedly demanded a better integration of low-wage earners in 
the BVG pension system through lowering the minimum wage require-
ment for pension coverage as well as an extension of joint management 
procedures to group pension contracts. The Federal Parliament fi nally 
acceded to these demands in 2003 but not without adding a reduction 
of the BVG conversion rate (from 7.2 percent to 6.8 percent by 2014, 
resulting in reduced pension benefi ts) to ensure long-term fi nancing. 
This compromise enabled the passage of the fi rst BVG revision and 
insulated it from a potential referendum campaign. During the same pe-
riod, the eleventh AHV revision faced heated controversies and failed 
to pass the referendum hurdle.
The BVG pension law compromise reached in 2003 combined con-
tradictory evolutions. On one hand, the lowering of the BVG wage fl oor 
(from 100 percent to 75 percent of a maximum AHV pension) partially 
took into account atypical work situations (primarily temporary and 
part-time work) as well as women’s structural under-participation in 
pension plans (Leimgruber 2010). On the other hand, the reduction of 
the conversion rate constituted a fi rst attack against a key feature de-
termining the level of BVG benefi ts. Moreover, while the argument of 
fi nancial consolidation has been systematically used to frame pension 
debates for the last 20 years, the fi nancial crises of the early twenty-fi rst 
century have also weighed on reforms implemented outside the scope 
of the BVG.
The dot com stock market crash of 2000–2001 caused the fi rst losses
in overall BVG assets since 1985. This fi nancial crisis also served as 
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the background for an intense campaign by insurers eager to disentan-
gle their companies from BVG constraints. In other words, the debate 
about the consolidation of the second pillar is also a battle led by pri-
vate interests to preserve their infl uence and autonomy in this domain. 
The 2003 compromise was thus accompanied by important measures 
that escaped the referendum mechanism. After sustained lobbying from 
insurers, the Federal Council lowered the guaranteed minimum BVG 
pension rate of return on investment from 4 percent (the level fi xed in 
1985) to 3.25 percent in 2003; then it was allowed to fl uctuate (reaching 
2.25 percent in 2004 and then 2.75 percent in 2008, before falling to 2 
percent in early 2010). Insurance companies also unilaterally lowered 
the conversion rate used for benefi ts above the BVG ceiling. Because 
of the complexity and institutional decentralization of the second pillar, 
resistance against these two measures has been largely ineffectual. In 
2004, the Federal Council granted insurance companies the controver-
sial right to keep 10 percent of the investment returns of BVG assets. 
This decision, which generates about CHF500 million annually in rev-
enues to insurers, has been denounced by pension experts who consider 
it to be contrary to the nonprofi t goal of the BVG (Killer 2009; Molo 
2009).
All of these measures enacted in parallel with the fi rst BVG revi-
sion underscore the permeability of the second pillar to private interests 
that have extensive means to shape the pension system. By contrast, 
these measures also underscore the fragile position of trade unions. 
Forced to accept “realist” compromises that end up having a negative 
impact on pensioners, trade unions have less leverage to counteract 
such dynamics.
Since 2000, public sector pension plans have faced increasing con-
solidation pressures as well. These pressures are part of the offensive 
against the few progressive dimensions of the second pillar. Because 
public sector plans tend to offer more generous benefi ts than those in 
the private sector, submitting them to fi nancial consolidation require-
ments is a powerful weapon linked to fi scally conservative campaigns 
waged against public budgets. Derided as onerous privileges, public 
sector pension plans face recurrent attacks and relentless austerity 
drives (Guex 1998).
Finally, the resurgence of radical reform proposals signals the hard-
ening of debates about pensions and their future. Left-wing critics of the 
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three-pillar doctrine have continued to argue in favor of an exit strategy 
from costly pension funding and a reinforcement of the pay-as-you-go 
AHV social security system. However, such positions remain minor-
ity opinions confi ned primarily to the left wing of trade unions (Swiss 
Trade Union Federation 2006). On the other side of the political divide, 
several free-market economists have repeatedly criticized the collectiv-
ist dimension of the second pillar and advocated the introduction of free 
choice in occupational pension provision. This option would lead to an 
individualization of the second pillar by severing the link between job 
contracts and pension plan affi liation (Gerber 2004). For the moment, 
this proposal has attracted only limited support among employers’ as-
sociations. Fearing that free choice might reopen the Pandora’s Box of 
alternative pension proposals and lead to endless confl icts with trade 
unions, employers’ associations recognize the pertinence of the idea but 
are loath to follow this path (Hasler 2003). Experts have also lambasted 
the option as inappropriate because it would disorganize and imbalance 
the present system (Pittet, Pittet, and Schneider 2005). In the meantime, 
individual retirement accounts have continued to expand—no less than 
2.7 million persons (out of a population of 8 million) have a third pillar 
individual account. However, contributions to these accounts (whose 
reserves are estimated at CHF60 billion) are very unequal. The fi rst seri-
ous study on the subject done by the Federal Tax Administration in late 
2009 confi rmed that the main benefi ciaries of the system are the banks, 
which offer low rates of return while having access to a steady fl ow of 
contributions, and the upper middle class, who benefi t the most from 
the tax deduction granted to individual retirement accounts. These tax 
subsidies represent annual losses of CHF450 million for the Confedera-
tion, while these individual third pillar accounts play only a minor role 
in pension provision, even among higher income retirees (Peters 2009; 
see also NZZ 2009). 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In retrospect, the March 2010 vote should not be viewed as an iso-
lated event, but rather an important moment in a particularly turbulent 
phase of social policy development. As early as 2002, insurance com-
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panies had already argued in favor of a benefi t conversion rate of 6.4 
percent. The fact that the fi rst BVG revision settled at 6.8 percent was 
not considered suffi cient, and pressures to further reduce the rate con-
tinued. The controversial decision to lower the rate in late 2009 had 
little to do with the fi nancial crisis that began in 2008 even if propo-
nents of the decrease used the crisis to stress the urgency and necessity 
of lowering the conversion rate. In a context that witnessed costly state 
intervention in favor of Swiss banks such as UBS, business appeals 
to implement fi nancial consolidation impacting pension benefi ts have 
caused resentment among the general public, even among the traditional
electorate of right-wing parties.
While the unequivocal result of the March 7 vote represents a clear 
disavowal of the reform favored by the political right and business, its 
medium-term impact remains to be seen. Immediately after the vote, 
the political left and trade unions tried to capitalize on the referendum 
success to present a series of demands aiming both to improve pension 
benefi ts for low-wage earners (e.g., an increase in the combined re-
placement rate of the fi rst and second pillar to 80 percent of past wages, 
compared to 60 percent today) and to more closely regulate life in-
surance companies offering group contracts. Pressure remains high on 
insurers, as illustrated by a recent parliamentary motion that demands 
their eviction from the BVG pension system and their confi nement to 
supplemental benefi ts of higher paid employees. However, such pro-
posals will have much diffi culty to get beyond the point of political 
gesturing. Less than two weeks after the March 7 vote, the left already 
had to focus its forces on a new referendum—this time to oppose cuts 
in unemployment insurance. While commentators briefl y feared a re-
peat of the March vote, the unemployment insurance reform cleared the 
referendum hurdle in September. A few weeks after, the new version of 
the eleventh AHV revision fl oundered in the Federal Assembly, after 
failing to clear a fi nal vote. The left had already announced its inten-
tion to oppose the revision, and its minority position was bolstered at 
the last minute by votes from the Swiss People’s Party. This important 
right-wing populist group was in favor of cuts in AHV pensions but 
preferred to vote down the revision rather than allow the left to launch a 
referendum campaign that might have been a distraction to the political 
right during the run-up to the federal elections of Autumn 2011 (NZZ 
2010c,d).
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These contradictory outcomes show that the March referendum 
victory was not suffi cient to block the long-term offensive against the 
level of pension benefi ts. As is often the case in Switzerland, the mul-
tiplication of referendum campaigns might drain and splinter left-wing 
forces in struggles against an agenda set by the political right and busi-
ness interests. Indeed, these forces have not abandoned the objective 
of the fi nancial consolidation of the second pillar. They still dictate the 
agenda and rhythm of reforms, not only in old-age provision, but also 
in the other domains of social protection. Several elements hint that 
business forces and the right are not ready to disarm. Before prudently 
backtracking a few weeks before the March 7 vote, the Liberal-Radical 
party (the main center-right party) discussed the possibility of launch-
ing a popular initiative to demand automatic cuts in social insurance 
programs in case of budget defi cits. The idea of a “defi cit brake,” which 
might help disarm referendum campaigns and “depoliticize” social de-
bates, has also been taken up by the main business associations. In a 
similar vein, the Federal Council has spoken in favor of linking the 
evolution of the BVG benefi t conversion rate to economic and demo-
graphic variables, which will also exert automatic downward pressure 
on the rate (NZZ 2010d).
Whatever issues these ongoing debates might have, they confi rm 
the increasing centrality of the second pillar provision in present and fu-
ture pension debates. Despite the controversies that may surround it, the 
three-pillar doctrine still remains the foundation of the Swiss pension 
system. In this context, submitting the core principles of the doctrine to 
a thorough critical analysis and untangling what is at stake in suppos-
edly technical reforms is absolutely necessary.
Notes
1. The 13 countries considered were all important pension markets. Switzerland 
topped the ranking, followed by the Netherlands, Australia, Sweden, and Can-
ada. Other countries mentioned were the United Kingdom, the United States, 
Chile, Singapore, Germany, China, and Japan. See http://www.mercer.com/
globalpensionindex and Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ 2010a). This preranking 
seems to have been leaked to the main Swiss fi nancial newspaper to serve as an 
argument in the referendum campaign analyzed in this paper. In the fi nal index, 
published on October 20, 2010, Mercer split the highest award between Switzer-
land and the Netherlands (see NZZ 2010b; Mercer, 2010).
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2. The BVG conversion rate is used to calculate the annual BVG pension from the 
overall BVG assets accumulated during a work life. Let us consider an employee 
whose BVG assets amount to CHF600,000 at the age of 65. With a 7.2 percent 
conversion rate (the rate between 1985 and 2004), her annual pensions would have 
amounted to CHF43,200. With a 6.8 percent rate (the rate enacted in 2004 and 
to be implemented in 2014), her pension would be lowered to CHF40,800. The 
proposed new law would have further reduced the conversion rate to 6.4 percent.
3. Feuille Fédérale (2009, p. 2937); see also http://www.swissvotes.ch.
4. As of August 2010, CHF1 = $0.96 = €0.72.
5. See Leimgruber (2008).
6. The Swiss Pension Funds Association (Association suisse des institutions de pré-
voyance, ASIP) is the direct heir of the fi rst pension funds association founded in 
1922. See also Leimgruber (2006).
7. See Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) at http://www
.fi nma.ch.
8. Winterthur Directors’ Board, December 5, 1978, quoted in Jung (2000).
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